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ROYAL DRUG AND McCARRAN ACT PROTECTION:
THE EXCEPTION OR THE RULE?-
GROUP LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE CO. V.
ROYAL DRUG CO.
The legislative protection of the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation
Act of 1945 (McCarran Act) 1 has provided the insurance industry with an
immunity from federal antitrust laws that is not enjoyed by other national
industries. 2 The Act protects traditional state regulation of the insurance
industry by allowing it to preempt federal control, while it leaves the door
open to federal antitrust regulation in the event that a state fails to exercise
such control. 3 The Supreme Court, however, has handed down a number
of decisions reflecting a strong reluctance to recognize judicially the preemp-
tion of federal law by state regulation. 4 By narrowly construing the term
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 9, 1945, Pub. L. 79-15,
ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33). The Act states in pertinent part:
§ 1011 Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest ...
§ 1012(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specif-
ically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That ... the Sherman Act,
... the Clayton Act, and .. . the Federal Trade Commission Act .. . shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by State Law.
§ 1013(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act
inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.
2. The McCarran Act was legislated by Congress as one of a limited number of express
exemptions from the Sherman Act and was intended to accommodate the special characteristics
of a particular industry. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978). See generally Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance:
Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587; Note, Federal Regulation of Insurance
Companies: The Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1340; Note, Applica-
tions of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1088 (1962);
Comment, The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemption for "the Business of Insurance": A Shrink-
ing Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REV. 329 (1976); Comment, State Regulation Under the McCarran
Act, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1069 (1973); The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for Procompetitive
Reform, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1271 (1976).
3. Section 2(b) of the Act provides that basic federal antitrust statutes be applicable "to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by state Law." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (1976).
4. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (the approval by the Arizona Direc-
tor of Insurance did not exempt an insurance company merger from federal regulation); FTC v.
Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960) (state regulation sufficient to preempt federal regu-
lation must govern an activity which both occurs and has its primary impact within that state);
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (issuance of variable annuity con-
tracts failed to qualify for exemption under the language of the McCarran Act requiring exemp-
ted activities to be part of the "business of insurance"--a phrase which must be defined by
federal courts as a matter of federal law). See note 60 infra.
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"business of insurance" 5 in the recent case of Group Life & Health Insur-
ance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 6 the Court again succeeded in effectively cur-
tailing state dominance over the insurance industry while serving notice that
state sovereignty in the area of insurance regulation may be the exception
rather than the rule.
The purpose of this Note is to examine Royal Drug in light of historic
changes in the Court's interpretive approach to the McCarran Act exemption
and to establish the case as representative of the Court's current pro-
antitrust position. The Note will criticize the Court's reasoning and discuss
the impact of the decision in regard to its precedential value as well as its
economic repercussion upon the health insurance industry-its products and
its premiums.
FACTS AND REASONING
Group Life & Health Insurance Company, also known as Blue Shield of
Texas (Blue Shield), offers the public a prepaid prescription drug policy
which is approved and regulated by the Texas State Board of Insurance. 7
The policy entitles the insured to purchase prescriptions from any pharmacy.
If the pharmacy selected has entered into a provider agreement 8 with Blue
Shield (Pharmacy Agreement),9 the insured pays only a two dollar policy
deductible, while the pharmacy's remaining acquisition costs are directly
reimbursed by Blue Shield. Should the policyholder purchase drugs from a
"non-participating" pharmacy, however, the individual must pay the full
price at the time of purchase and subsequently apply to Blue Shield for
reimbursement. Under these circumstances, the policyholder receives only
seventy-five percent of the customary charge for the drug, less the two dol-
lar deductible.
Independent, "non-participating" pharmacists brought a civil antitrust ac-
tion against Blue Shield, alleging that the Pharmacy Agreements fixed the
5. The phrase "business of insurance" is a direct quote from the text of the McCarran Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1976). The Act exempts from federal regulation only those activities which
are both governed by state regulation and which may be categorized as part of the "business of
insurance."
6. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
7. Pursuant to the authority invested in the State Board of Insurance and its Commissioner
under Article 3.42 of the Insurance Code, TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.42 (Supp. 1977), is-
suance of the policy involved was duly approved in Oct., 1974, and was subsequently regulated
by the State Board as provided under Article 21.21, TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (1963).
Prior to this, Blue Shield provided identical coverage under a policy which the Commissioner
had exempted from the approval requirements of the Code in Sept., 1969. Brief for Petitioner
at 32-34.
8. A provider agreement is the contract between a purchaser and a supplier of either goods
or services.
9. Blue Shield offered to enter into this provider contract with each licensed pharmacy in
Texas. The Agreement established a ceiling on the mark-up available to participating pharmacies
in the amount of the policy's two dollar deductible. 440 U.S. at 209. Additional reimbursement
for the pharmacy's acquisition costs was limited to the actual billed and paid costs of the prod-
ncts dispensed. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Blue Shield Assoc., App. C at 9a.
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retail price of drugs and pharmaceuticals 10 in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 11 Additionally, plaintiffs asserted that provisional conditions
within the insurance contract establishing economic incentives for policyhold-
ers to deal exclusively with participating pharmacies served to coerce an
unlawful group boycott. 12 The District Court for the Western District of
Texas granted Blue Shield's motion to dismiss based upon the provisions of
the McCarran Act. 13  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed.' 4  In a decision
from which four justices dissented, the Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment and reasoning of the court of appeals. 15
The Court focused its reasoning on interpretation of the statutory phrase
"business of insurance" and concluded that the contractual arrangements be-
tween Blue Shield and "participating" pharmacies were not within the scope
of that phrase. 16 The Court began its analysis by quoting an earlier opinion
which distinguished the "business of insurers" from the "business of insur-
ance." 17 After establishing that mere activity by an insurance company was
not a sufficient basis for application of the McCarran exemption, the Court
10. Insofar as the two dollar policy deductible established a comparable ceiling on the drug
mark-up available to "'participating" pharmacists, the Pharmacy Agreements were charged with
fixing prices on these items. 440 U.S. at 209.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This Section provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dol-
lars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
12. 440 U.S. at 207.
13. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
After extensive discovery, dismissal was based upon the following findings: 1) the activities
specified in the complaint and the Pharmacy Agreement itself constitute the "business of insur-
ance," Id. at 347; 2) the State of Texas was effectively regulating such business, Id. at 348; and,
therefore, 3) according to the McCarran Act, the federal antitrust laws were preempted by the
state's regulation, Id. at 349.
14. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977). The
reversal was based upon the appellate court's conclusion that the provider agreements between
Blue Shield and participating pharmacies were not part of the "business of insurance." Id. at
1382. The appellate court did not reach the other questions decided by the trial court.
15. 440 U.S. at 233. Justice Brennan dissented and filed an opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Marshall and Powell joined.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 211. The Court quoted the following from one of its earlier decisions:
The statute did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all the ac-
tivities of insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons or companies
who are subject to state regulation, but to laws 'regulating the business of insur-
ance.' Insurance companies do many things which are subject to paramount federal
regulations; only when they are engaged in the 'business of insurance' does the
statute apply.
Id., quoting SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969).
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evaluated Blue Shield's Pharmacy Agreement in terms of its ability to satisfy
two essential characteristics of the "business of insurance" that were de-
lineated in previous decisions.
The first of these characteristics, recognized in SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Co., 18 was the significance of underwriting or spreading of
risk as an indicium of insurance. 19 In applying this standard, the Royal
Drug Court concluded that the Pharmacy Agreement itself spread no risk
but was simply the means whereby the insurer provided the benefits for
which the policyholder had contracted. 20 Blue Shield argued that the un-
derwriting of risk was a combination of selecting the best customers (risk
assessment), reducing the risk (risk reduction), and increasing the predicta-
bility of that reduced risk.21 The Court rejected Blue Shield's contention
that the Pharmacy Agreements spread the risk assumed by the insurance
company because they reduced the risk and provided more certainty as to
the potential magnitude of that risk.2 2
The second factor considered in the Court's analysis was the contractual
relationship between the insurer and the policyholder. 23 The landmark de-
cision of SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 2 4  set forth several
guidelines for determining the "business of insurance." These
guidelines included: (1) the type of policy issued; (2) the reliabilty, interpre-
tation, and enforcement of that policy; and (3) the relationship between the
insurer and the insured. 25 The Royal Drug Court narrowly construed the
18. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
19. Id. at 71. In Variable Annuity, the Court held that insurers could not rely on the
McCarran Act to exempt them from complying with federal securities registration requirements.
A variable annuity was held to be a security rather than insurance because of the lack of an
assumption of risk. Id. This decision reflected the classic definitions and concepts of insurance.
See 1 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:3 (1931 & Supp. 1966); R. KEETON, INSURANCE
LAW § 1.2(a) (1971).
20. 440 U.S. at 214-15. Relying heavily on a distinction made by the government in its
amicus brief, the Court concluded that risk reduction is a separate concept rather than a neces-
sary ingredient in risk underwriting as asserted by petitioner. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 15-19. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text infra.
21. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 20-21.
22. 440 U.S. at 213-14.
23. Id. at 215.
24. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
25. Id. at 460. In National Securities, a merger between two insurance firms which previ-
ously had been approved by the Arizona Director of Insurance was successfully enjoined for
violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5. In refusing to allow the McCar-
ran Act to exempt the merger from federal regulation, the Court promulgated a restrictive new
standard. In what remains to date as the most extensive attempt to define the scope of the
exemption, the Court stated:
The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be
issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement-these were the core of the
'business of insurance.' Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate
so closely to their status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the
same class. But whatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the
focus was-it was on the relationship between the insurance company and the
[Vol. 29:147
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National Securities' phrase "relationship between insurer and insured" to
mean "between insurer and insured."'2 6  By deleting the word "relation-
ship," the Court was required to address simply the question of whether the
parties to the contract were in fact the insurer and the insured. This restric-
tive application of National Securities allowed the Court to conclude nar-
rowly that separate contractual arrangements between a provider and an in-
surance company failed to meet the standard of being "between insurer and
insured." 2 7  The Court rejected Blue Shield's assertion that the Pharmacy
Agreement fell within the National Securities guidelines because of its inti-
mate relationship with "the type of policy which could be issued, its reliabil-
ity, interpretation and enforcement." 2 8  Without ever directly addressing
the obvious interdependence between the Pharmacy Agreements and the
"relationship between insurer and insured," 29 the Court asserted that, at
best, Blue Shield succeeded in establishing probable interaction between the
agreements and the policyholders' premiums. 30
In concluding its case law analysis, the Court rejected a previous line of
cases which held that ramification upon rate-schedule structures was a suffi-
policyholder. Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or
indirectly, are laws regulating the 'business of insurance.'
Id.
Relying on the standard set forth in National Securities, subsequent decisions have held a
variety of activities to be within the "business of insurance." See, e.g., American Family Life
Assurance Co. v. Blue Cross, 486 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'g, 346 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla.
1972) (insurance services provided under another name); Commander Leasing Co. v. Trans-
america Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973) (title search services included within the
"business of insurance"); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564,
supplemental opinion, 384 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (same); Sanborn v. Palm, 336 F. Supp.
222 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (the appropriation by one insurance company of another's name was held
to be within the "business of insurance").
Additionally, by applying the National Securities criteria to provider agreements, many courts
have held them to be within the "business of insurance." See, e.g., Frankford Hosp. v. Blue
Cross, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977) (participating agreement
between hospitals and insurer); Anderson v. Medical Serv., 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'g,
1976-1 Trade Cas (CCH) 60,884 (E.D. Va. 1976) (participating agreement between a health
care insurer and physicians); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 557 F.2d 1001 (3d. Cir. 1976), aff'g,
431 F. Supp. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (participating agreement between a health care insurer and
physicians); Travelers v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, "414 U.S. 1093 (1973)
(participating agreement between hospitals and insurer); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp.
Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (same); Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F.
Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976), appeal pending, Nos. 77-1751 and 77-1752 (9th Cir.) (participating
agreements between dentists and insurers); St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n,
1978-1 Trade Cas (CCH) 61,868 (E.D. La. 1977) (participating agreement between hospitals
and insurer); Winters v. Kansas Hosp. Serv. Ass'n, Inc., 1975-1 Trade Cas (CCH) 60,140 (D.
Kan. 1974) (same).
26. 440 U.S. at 216.
27. Id.
28. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969). The Royal Drug Court simply
responded, "[t]his argument, however, proves too much." 440 U.S. at 216.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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cient qualification for granting an exemption tinder the McCarran Act.3 1
The Court categorized these ramifications as merely the products of business
decisions. It reasoned that to allow these "business decisions" to qualify as
the "business of insurance" because they affected rates would necessitate
recognizing almost every business decision made by an insurance company
as exempt firom federal regulation. 32
As secondary support for its decision, the majority presented a synopsis of
the legislative history of the McCarran Act. 33 The Court noted that Con-
gress originally declined to pass legislation providing the insurance industry
with a blanket exemption from federal antitrust laws. 34 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the Act's legislative history provided support for the
judicial reduction of the exemption's applicability. In further support of its
interpretation of the legislature's intent, the Court pointed out that at the
time the McCarran Act was passed, the courts did not recognize arrange-
ments like Blue Cross and Blue Shield as insurance. 35 The Court, there-
31. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.), aff'g 406 F.
Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3375 (1977) (the close relationship
between the cost of reimbursing damage claims and the insurance rates was held to justify the
inclusion of agreements between insurers and preferred automobile repair shops within the
scope of the "business of insurance"); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 557 F.2d 1001 (3d. Cir.
1977), affg', 431 F. Supp. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 554 F.2d 1253
(3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d.
Cir.), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins.
Co., 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973); Manasen v. Califlornia Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), appeal pending, Nos. 77-1751 and 77-1752 (9th Cir.). This line of cases developed as
a direct result of the decision in National Securities which held ratemaking as part of the "busi-
ness of insurance." See note 25 supra. See also Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust
Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 625.
32. 440 U.S. at 217.
33. Id. at 217-30. The Act was passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). This case held for the
first time that the insurance industry was a part of interstate commerce and therefore subject to
federal regulation tinder the commerce clause. The McCarran Act represented the legislature's
attempt to retain state regulation and taxation of the business of insurance in the wake of uncer-
tainties created by the decision in South Eastern Underwriters. S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1945).
34. 90 CONG. REC. 6565 (1944). This bill failed in the Conference Committee after having
passed in the House of Representatives. It was opposed by the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners. 90 CONG. REC. 8482 (1944). The Act, as ultimately passed, was largely the
opposition bill proposed by that organization. 91 CONG. REC. 483 (1945) (remarks of Sen.
O'Mahoney).
35. 440 U.S. at 225-26. See Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (a
group health association incorporated as a non-profit organization furnishing medical services
and supplies was held not to be insurance); California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 155 P.2d
885 (Cal. App. 1945), aff'd, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946) (a non-profit physicians' service
corporation was held not to be insurance); Commissioner of Banking & Ins. v. Community
Health Serv., 129 N.J.S. 427, 30 A.2d 44 (1943) (same). As the Court points out, the only case
to the contrary was Cleveland Hosp. Serv. Ass'n v. Ebright, 142 Ohio St. 51, 49 N.E.2d 929
(1943) (contracts sold by a non-profit hospital service corporation were held as "substantially
ROYAL DRUG
fore, deduced that it would be impossible to conclude that Congress had any
intention of including prepaid medical provider plans within the "business of
insurance." 
36
As a final reason for affirming the appellate court's decision, the Court
reconfirmed and applied two general principles stated in previous antitrust
decisions. First, the Court reiterated its policy of narrowly construing all
exemptions, both implied and express, from federal antitrust regulation.
37
Second, the Court cited the judicial policy that an exemption is forfeited
when one of the parties involved is a non-exempt entity. 3' The Court held
amounting to insurance"). In addition, two cases decided after the McCarran Act also held that
these plans were not insurance. Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d
638 (1954) (a contract merely entitling certificate holders to medical services or supplies at
reduced rates was not held to be insurance); Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 101
R.I. 708, 227 A.2d 105 (1967) (a corporation which provided hospital care to its subscribers was
not part of the insurance industry).
36. 440 U.S. at 227. As pointed out by the dissent, however, this conclusion appears to be in direct
conflict with the Court's earlier interpretation of the McCarran Act in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). The Royal Drug dissent quoted the following:" 'We realize that... insurance
is an evolving institution. Common knowledge tells us that the forms have greatly changed even in a
generation. And we would not undertake to freeze the concept 'insurance' . . . into the mold it fitted
when these Federal Acts were passed.' " 440 U.S. at 238 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting SEC v.
Variable. Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959).
37. 440 U.S. at 231. See Abbott Labs v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, Inc., 425 U.S. 1
(1976) (drugs purchased by a non-profit hospital but not put to its exclusive use failed to qualify
for exemption under the Nonprofit Institutions Act); Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (the first proviso in § 8(e) of the National
Labor Relations Act was held not to authorize subcontracting agreements that were neither
within the context of a collective-bargaining relationship nor limited to any particular jobsite);
FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973) (§ 15 of the Shipping Act does not exempt
one-time acquisition-of-assets agreements that result in one of the contracting parties ceasing to
exist); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305 (1956) (exemptions of the Miller-
Tydings and the McGuire Acts were expressly made inapplicable to agreements "between
wholesalers").
38. 440 U.S. at 231. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302 (1971) (a union was
held to have forfeited its antitrust exemption when it agreed with an employer group to impose
a certain wage scale on other bargaining units, thus joining a conspiracy to limit competition);
Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967) (it was not the intention of
Congress to allow an organization with non-producer interests to avail itself of the exemption
provided by the Capper-Volstead Act by contracting with one so protected); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (a union was held to have forfeited its antitrust
exemption when it entered into agreement with non-exempt large coal operators); United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (dairymen's agreements with non-exempt distributors failed
to qualify under the Capper-Volstead Act); Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Quantas Airways Ltd,
525 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976) (the scope of an antitrust
immunity was held to be no broader than the industry so regulated).
In other contexts, the Court has insisted on focusing on the industry affected by anticompeti-
tive activities while refusing to allow exemptions in one area to be extended to other businesses.
See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (protection under patent
laws did not exempt agreements requiring lessees of patented machines to use only inventor's
unpatented products in their operation); McCullough v. Krammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th
Cir. 1948) (the purpose of the patent laws was to encourage invention; therefore, agreements
not to exercise inventive powers in creating competing devices failed to qualify for exemption).
1979]
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that when these two policies were considered together, each not only sup-
ported application of the other, but also sustained the holding that Pharmacy
Agreements between an insurer and an entity outside the insurance industry
should not be considered within the "business of insurance." 3 9
THE TREND IN MCCARRAN ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION
For more than twenty years after passage of the McCarran Act, judicial
decisions generally relied on the assumption that the term "business of in-
surance" included virtually all activities engaged in by both insurance com-
panies and their agents. 40 The courts determined qualification under the
exemption by focusing on the existence of state regulation. 41
FTC v. National Casualty Co. 42 accurately illustrates the early judicial
emphasis on the mere existence of state regulation. In National Casualty,
the Federal Trade Commission enjoined certain advertising practices it al-
leged were false, misleading, and deceptive. 4a Setting aside the Commis-
This principle was expressed by the Court in the context of the insurance industry when it
stated in Hill v. National Auto Glass Co., 1971 Trade Cas (CCH) T 73,594, 90,459 (N.D. Cal.
1971), that "[c]ongress at no time indicated an intent to give insurance companies carte blanche
to operate in concert with noninsurance companies. The AlcCarran Act will be narrowly con-
strued by this Court to extend only so far as the problem it sought to solve." See also Battle v.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 110 (1975) (an
insurer's wholly owned subsidiary providing merchandise and services required by its policies
was not exempt under the McCarran Act); Center Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Beyers, 1976-1 Trade
Cas (CCH) 60,940 (N.D. II1. 1976) (conduct of the advertising agency employed by an insurer
was not exempt under the McCarran Act). Contra, Lowe v. AARCO-American, Inc., 536 F.2d
1160 (1976). In Lowe, the Seventh Circuit, interpreting the National Securities decision, granted
exemptive status under the McCarran Act despite the fact that neither the insurance broker nor
the premium finance company who made credit sales of insurance policies were insurance com-
panies. The court of appeals held:
Moreover, the fact that neither appellee is an insurance company does not take the
disputed transaction outside the scope of the 'business of insurance.' There is noth-
ing in the McCarran Act which limits the 'business of insurance' to the business of
insurance companies, for as the Supreme Court has stated, "the Act's language re-
fers not to the persons or companies who are subject to state regulation, but to laws
'regulating the business of insurance.'"
Id. at 1162.
39. 440 U.S. at 231.
40. See Transnational Ins. Co. v. Roselund, 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966) (a state's legisla-
tion regulating the "business of insurance" was so liberally construed that it preempted federal
regulation of a defendant company's allegedly conspiratorial activities); Professional & Bus.
Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958) (an insurance
company's conspiracy to drive a competitor out of business was within the "business of insur-
ance"); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 242
F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957) (antitrust activity by insurance companies
and their officers was exempt from regulation under the Sherman Act). See also Note, The McCarran-
Ferguson Act: A Time for Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1271, 1281 (1976).
41. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 561-62.
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sion's orders, the Court reasoned that under the McCarran Act the Commis-
sion lacked authority to issue such orders in states having laws forbidding
the specified practices. 44 The Court further held that the legislative history
of the Act failed to support the Commission's argument that a general statu-
tory prohibition alone failed to qualify as regulation. 4 5  Finally, the Court
found that the state regulation requirement of the McCarran exemption was
satisfied. The Court never considered, however, whether the advertising of
policies fell within the "business of insurance." 46
In addition to exemplifying the original approach taken by the courts in
applying the McCarran exemption, National Casualty was also the pro-
genitor of a separate line of cases which hold that the extent of active regula-
tion is not a crucial determinant of exemptive status. 47 The failure of the
Court in National Casualty to draw a distinct delineation between legislation
and regulation 4 has resulted in a series of decisions which rely on National
44. Id. at 562-63. The Court stated, "An examination of that statute and its legislative history
establishes that the Act withdrew from the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate
respondents' advertising practices in those States which are regulating those practices under their own
laws." In relying on the Act's legislative history for support, the Court cited to the following: 91 CONG.
REC. 1481 (remarks of Sen. Ferguson); 91 CONG. REc. 1443 (remarks of Sen. McCarran); 91 CONG. REC.
1087, 1089-1090 (remarks of Reps. Hancock and Gwynne); 91 CONG. REC. 482-483 (remarks of Sens.
Ferguson, Murdock, and Radcliffe); S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560, 563 (1958).
45. FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958). The Court failed, however, to
go beyond its assertion and explain why the exemption requirements were satisfied. It also
failed to provide guidelines for future determinations or to indicate what factors were required
for a state system to qualify as regulation.
46. Accord, Transnational Ins. Co. v. Roselund, 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966). In Trans-
national, by liberally construing the state of Washington's anticompact law, the district court
exempted the alleged conspiracy from federal regulation without ever addressing the issue of
whether such a conspiracy was part of the "business of insurance."
47. See, e.g., Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972) (the mere existence of a statutory scheme of state regulation was
alone sufficient to preempt federal law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966) (state regulation did not have to require that auto insurers
adhere to rates fixed by a rating bureau in order to qualify for exemption under the McCarran
Act); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied. 355 U.S.
828 (1957); Cerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (regulatory legisla-
tion concerning disclosure in premium financing agreements precluded applicability of the
Truth in Lending Act); Sanborn v. Palm, 336 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Holly Springs
Funeral Home, Inc. v. United Funeral Serv., Inc., 303 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (a
provision in a burial insurance policy which had been approved by the state legislature and the
insurance commissioner was exempt although it provided that claims for services performed by
unauthorized funeral homes need not be honored); California League of Independent Ins. Pro-
ducers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (state regulation
merely permitting or authorizing specific conduct was sufficient to qualify for exemption under
the McCarran Act); Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F.
Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958).
48. FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564-5 (1958). The Court, having first
negated the necessity of an administrative system reflective of federal regulation, proceeded to
state, "However, assuming there is some difference in the McCarran-Ferguson Act between
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Casually as precedent that a state's legislation might satisfy the requirement
of the McCarran Act even if it failed to actually result in effective regula-
tion. 49
The first of these decisions, the landmark case of California League of
Independent Insurance Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Insurance Co., 50
held that a state regulation was required to meet only minimal standards of
effectiveness. Relying on National Casualty as primary support, the district
court in California League held that a state was regulating the "business of
insurance" when it merely legislated generally to proscribe, permit, or au-
thorize specific conduct of the insurance companies. 51 The California
League decision reinforced the judicial deference to state regulation already
prevalent in McCarran exemptions, 52 while at the same time discouraging
any in-depth examination of those regulations. 53 Under California League,
essentially any insurance company can obtain exempted status if a state stat-
ute exists dealing with the activity in question. 54
The most recent case adopting this reasoning is Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insur-
ance Rating Board. 55 Citing to both National Casualty and California
League as support for its holding, 56 the Sixth Circuit stretched this rationale
to an attenuated conclusion. The court held that existence of the state reg-
ulatory agency was sufficient to preempt federal law 57 even though the
'legislation' and 'regulation,' nothing in the language of that Act or its legislative history supports
the distinctions drawn by petitioner." Id.
49. See note 38 supra. This holding also represents the intention of the Act's sponsor,
Senator McCarran. He wrote: [t]hus, for purposes of enforcement of federal laws, the question
is one strictly of legal construction. The inquiry will be: 'Is this practice regulated by State
law?'-not 'Is it effectively regulated?' or 'Is it wisely regulated?', but simply: 'Is it regulated?' "
McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance: Moratorium Under Public Law 15 Expired July 1, 34
A.B.A.J. 539, 542 (1948).
50. 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
51. Id. at 860. Plaintiffs charged the defendants with conspiring to restrain trade by acting
in concert to decrease the rate of commission paid to automobile insurance agents. The court,
however, ruled that plaintiffs failed to state a claim based upon the McCarran Act and so dis-
missed the action. Justifying the ruling on its interpretation of National Casualty, the opinion
stated: "In F.T.C. v. National Cas. Co . the Court held that there was State regulation
within the meaning of § 1012 (b) when a State act generally prohibited 'certain standards of
conduct'." Id.
52. See note 38 supra.
53. The prevalent emphasis upon the mere existence of a state regulation made it appear
unnecessary to go beyond a cursory examination of a state statute. Therefore, the emphasis
upon existence discouraged serious analysis of state regulations.
54. See Comment, State Regulation Under the McCarran Act, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1069, 1075
(1973).
55. 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972).
56. Id. at 1180-81.
57. Id. Quoting from the district court's opinion, the appellate court approved the following:
'A court is not empowered to make a policy judgment as to the type of regulation
which is desirable. The Ohio legislature has adopted a statutory scheme which sets
standards for insurance rates. This court is not concerned with the wisdom of the
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statutorily authorized Ohio Insurance Rating Board never denied a request
for a rate increase. 58
In an effort to counteract the liberal application of the McCarran exemp-
tion created by focusing on only the issue of state regulation, 59 a second
approach was promulgated which narrowed the scope of the exemption.
Courts began to interpret the McCarran Act via a circumspect analysis of the
phrase "business of insurance." 60  Departing from their earlier assumption
that the "business of insurance" could be equated with the business of insur-
ance companies, 6 1 the judiciary did not rely solely on the fact that a defend-
standards but with the limited question of whether or not the legislation is regula-
tion under the McCarran Act.'
Id.
Relying also on the reasoning in Lynch v. Insurance Rating Bd, No. 5202 (D.C.M.D.
Tenn.), the court went on to state,"[a]s pointed out in the Lynch case... there is nothing in the
language of the McCarran Act or in its legislative history to support the thesis that the Act does
not apply when the state's scheme of regulation has not been effectively enforced." Ohio AFL-
CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd, 451 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917
(1972).
This theory was also adopted by a Senate Sub-committee, reviewing the intention of the McCarran
Act as it interpreted the National Casualty decision, when it stated:
It now seems evident from this Supreme Court decision that the McCarran Act
language, 'to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law,' restricts
Federal authority regardless of whether the States are actively enforcing their regu-
lations. If the States have enacted regulatory statutes, capable of being enforced
within their borders, the Federal antitrust laws would apparently not apply. In such
cases, no proof would apparently be entertained as to the extent to which the law
had been administratively enforced. It also seems doubtful the Court would permit
a questioning as to the quality of the State regulatory law.
REPORT OF THE SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE ON ANTI-TRUST AND MONOPOLY, THE INSUR-
ANCE INDUSTRY-AvIATION, MARINE AND STATE REGULATION, S. REP. No. 1834, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1960).
58. In addition, the Ohio regulatory agency never even employed an actuary to review the
rates established by the industry. See Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd, 409 U.S. 917,
917-18 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59. By 1948, 45 states, two territories, and the District of Columbia enacted rate regulatory
laws. McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance: Moratorium Under Public Law 15 Expired July
1, 34 A.B.A.J. 539, 540 (1948).
Given the fact that most states accepted the invitation of the McCarran Act to establish
state systems regulating the insurance industry, qualification based upon the existence of even
ineffective regulation was extremely easy to satisfy. See generally Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson
Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587; Note,
Federal Regulation of Insurance Companies: The Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption, 1973 DUKE
L.J. 1340; Comment, The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemption for "the Business of Insurance": A
Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REv. 329 (1976); Comment, State Regulation Under the McCarran
Act, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1069 (1973); Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for Procompetitive
Reform, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1271 (1976).
60. The Variable Annuity decision held that a definition of the term "business of insurance"
must be reached by the federal courts as a matter of federal law. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 67-69 (1959).
61. See notes 40-41 supra. The courts' reliance on this assumption mirrored a similar as-
sumptive position taken by Congress. The legislative record contains many statements made at
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ant was an insurance company. 62 Reflecting this analysis of the McCarran
exemption, the Supreme Court's recent decisions have further restricted the
construction of "business of insurance." 6 3
Royal Drug, the Court's most recent and restrictive decision, extends this
pattern. In applying only the Variable Annuity test of risk underwriting 64
and that part of the National Securities standard dealing with the relation-
ship between the insurer and the insured, 6 Royal Drug has further re-
stricted the application of immunity. 66 By confining itself to these two
tests, the Court has significantly reduced the possibility that an insurance
company will achieve exemptive status. Consequently, the Court has dis-
avowed the validity of the following factors previously considered by courts in
determining whether conduct was within the "business of insurance":
the time the McCarran Act was passed in which congressional leaders freely interchanged the
two phrases. For example, Senator Pepper stated, "[W]e should not give the insurance com-
panies immunity. ... 91 CONG. REc. 1444 (1945). Senator Murdock argued, "Certainly the very
purpose of the bill . . . is to provide that state legislatures ... may relieve insurance companies from
contracts in restraint of trade." 91 CONG. REc. 480 (1945). Senator Barkley expressed concern that an
effort might be made by the states "[t]o put insurance companies within the State on an island of safety
from congressional regulation." 91 CONG. Rc. 1488 (1945).
62. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1959), illustrates the Court's
originally shallow acceptance of insurance company status as satisfaction of the "business of
insurance" requirement of the McCarran Act. In Variable Annuity, subjection to the federal
securities laws was based upon the defendant's inability to qualify as an insurance company. Id.
63. The following decisions support this contention: Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 548
(1978) (the "boycott" clause of § 3(b) of the McCarran Act shall include but not be limited to
"blacklisting and other exclusionary devices directed at independent insurance companies or
agents") SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards
Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962) (a Texas tax on out-of-state insurance transactions was held invalid);
FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 65 (1959); FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958); Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (a marine insurance policy was held subject to
federal laws under the admiralty clause of the constitution); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408 (1946) (state tax on foreign insurance companies was held valid under the protec-
tion of the McCarran Act).
In four of the five cases dealing specifically with state usurption of federal regulation, the
phrase was so narrowly construed as to hold federal law not preempted. See Group Life &
Health Ins. Co. v, Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453 (1969); FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 359'U.S. 65 (1959). In contrast, the Court in FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S.
560 (1958), held federal law preempted by state legislation.
64. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
66. The Court failed to establish guidelines for applying that part of the National Securities
standard dealing with reliability as an insurer, interpretation and enforcement of policies, and
types of policies which qualify for exemption. This failure has the effect of emasculating that
portion of the National Securities standard capable of providing a broad basis for allowing
exemptive status.
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whether the insurer's purpose is only to control costs, 67 whether the in-
surer's conduct is regulated by statute, 68 whether the insurer's conduct is
regarded by applicable state laws as the "business of insurance," 69 and
whether the conduct is peculiar to the "business of insurance." 70
That the Royal Drug decision was intended by the Court to provide a
definitive clarification of the scope of exemptive status under the McCarran
Act is revealed by its initial declaration that, "[wie granted certiorari because
of intercircuit conflicts as to the meaning of the phrase 'business of insur-
ance in § 2(b) of the Act." 71 The Court's willingness to hold contrary to every
other circuit deciding the identical issue appears to substantiate the Court's
serious intention to promulgate a more restrictive application of the exemp-
tion. 72 Therefore, insofar as the Royal Drug decision sets forth the nar-
rowest standard yet promulgated by the Court, it stands as the culmination
67. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1975),
aff'd, 561 F.2d 262, 268 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3375
(1977).
68. See, e.g., Royal Drug v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375, 1381 (5th Cir.
1977).
69. See, e.g., Pastor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas (CCH) 60,783, 63,397
(C.D. Cal. 1976) (physician's suit against a California county medical association dismissed).
70. See, e.g., Royal Drug v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375, 1383 (5th Cir.
1977); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27, 30 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd,
561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3375 (1977); American Family
Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Marketing Assoc., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (E.D. Va.
1974); United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 1976-2 Trade Cas (CCH) 61,044, 69,674 (N.D.
Cal. 1976) (an insurance company's selection of its directors is not an act as "peculiar to the
insurance industry" as to come within the meaning of the "business of insurance").
71. 440 U.S. at 208.
72. See note 19 supra. Also, it is contrary to the following district precedents: Manasen v.
California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land
Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974), supplemental opinion, 384 F. Supp. 302
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Mich. 1973);
California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 175 F. Supp.
857 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
This intention is further substantiated by the Court's interpretations of other exemptions
from federal regulation so as to reduce their applicability and hence their effectiveness. See City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (established a presumption
against any implied exclusion of municipalities from coverage under the federal antitrust laws);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 775 (1975) (restricted the application of the "learned
profession" exemption).
Congress is currently considering an antitrust bill prepared by Senator Edward Kennedy
(D-Mass). Senator Kennedy's bill has the potential impact of increasing the number of plaintiffs
in antitrust litigation. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977), only direct purchasers may sue for treble damages in price-fixing cases. Senator
Kennedy's bill, however, would allow consumers, as well as state and local governments, who
qualified as direct or indirect purchasers, to sue manufacturers for price-fixing. Lawscope, 65
A.B.A.J. 896 (1979). In addition, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) is considering the
proposal of legislation to end the insurance industry's antitrust exemptions under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Lawscope, 65 A.B.A.J. 1154 (1979).
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of a judicial trend which has reduced the exemptive status congressionally
bestowed upon the insurance industry.
ROYAL DRUG-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Royal Drug decision first can be criticized for its one-sided interpreta-
tion of previous case law. Its application of the National Securities holding
failed to reflect or acknowledge all of the guidelines established in that deci-
sion. 73 The Royal Drug analysis appears to rest on an extensively inbred
rationale because the Court chose to apply only those tests from Variable
Annuity and National Securities which could not be met by the Pharmacy
Agreement. Additionally, the Court refised to acknowledge or explain why
satisfaction of other established criteria was of no consequence. 71
The Court's selective approach to interpreting the guidelines promulgated
in National Securities does not provide an accurate representation of that
opinion. For the last ten years, National Securities has been repeatedly rec-
ognized as judicial authority for the premise that ratemaking is included in
the term "business of insurance."7 5 It also has been cited as support for the
proposition that the "business of insurance" includes those activities which
affect both the reliability and the enforcement of a policy as well as the very
type of policy which is issued. 76 By failing to apply these guidelines, the
Royal Drug Court ignored the critical fact that in a prepaid drug policy a
provider arrangement must exist as the means by which an insurer "obtains
the very benefits promised in the policy; it does not simply relate to the
general operation of the company." 77 The Court's refisal to recognize and
address this reality illustrates its failure to adjust to the expansion and de-
velopment of new insurance products. In this respect, the decision curtailed
the protection originally provided by the legislature to foster the growth of
an industry in order to meet the needs of our society. 78
A second criticism is the Royal Drug Court's narrow interpretive approach
in applying the guideline excerpted from the Variable Annuity decision. In
maintaining that underwriting, or spreading of risk, is an "indispensable
73. See note 25 supra.
74. It was as if the Court had employed selective recall in supporting its contentions. By
ignoring its own precedential statements which do not support its conclusion, the Court ap-
peared to have reached its decision first and then searched about for substantiation, rather than
reasoning its decision on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the propositions which support
its conclusion as well as those which do not.
75. See note 31 supra.
76. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir, 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1093 (1973); Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir.
1973); Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Proctor v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1975), affd, 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.
1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3375 (1977); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title
Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564, supplemental opinion, 384 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
77. 440 U.S. at 246-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959).
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characteristic of insurance," 79 the Court ignored the legislative history of the
McCarran Act 8 ° as well as its own prior assertions that unilateral acts which
do not involve underwriting are within the scope of the exemption. 81 In
fact, by asserting that the fixing of rates which itself does not underwrite or
spread risk is within the "business of insurance,"82 the Royal Drug Court
conceded that some arrangements exist which qualify for exemptive status
although they fail to possess this "indispensable characteristic." 83 Having
made this conceptual concession, the Court appeared less than intellectually
forthright in failing to discuss why a provider agreement which is essential to
the ratemaking process 8 4 does not qualify as such an exception.
As a final criticism, the Royal Drug decision may constitute too narrow an
attack upon too broad a problem. In light of the potentially vast impact the
decision may have upon future insurance products and their availability to
the public, 85 the Court's narrow antitrust perspective on the issues may
contravene laudable government policies regarding the containment of
health-care costs. 86 The Court may be legitimately criticized for judicially
legislating in an area in which it lacks the administrative resources necessary
properly to evaluate interrelated issues and economic ramifications.
THE IMPACT OF THE ROYAL DRUG DECISION
The Royal Drug decision will reduce the National Securities standards and
will decrease significantly the potential number of provider arrangements
which will qualify for exemption under the McCarran Act. 87 The Court's
79. 440 U.S. at 211.
80. See 90 CONG. REc. 6538 (remarks of Cong. Celler).
81. SEC v. National Sees, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969). See note 25 supra.
82. 440 U.S. at 223.
83. Id. at 224-25, n.32.
84. See notes 91-92 infra.
85. See note 93 infra.
86. The concern of state insurance regulators has been well documented in case law. See,
e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 83-84 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093
(1973); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 431 F. Supp. 5, 6-7, 10 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 557 F.2d
1001 (3d Cir. 1977); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104, 1106-07 (E.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977).
With respect to these areas in which costs have increased significantly, Congress has
enacted or is considering legislation. See, e.g., Social Security Act and Amendments, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320 (1975); Hospital Cost Containment Act of 1977, H.R. 6575 and S. 1391, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977). In addition, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare is considering the
following: 45 C.F.R. § 19; Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Proposed Regulation,
43 Fed. Reg. 20,516 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 450). But perhaps the greatest
attestation of federal involvement in controlling the costs of health care is represented by the
federal health insurance programs, i.e., Medicare and Medicaid.
87. If future decisions apply the National Securities test of "relationship between insurer
and insured" as is narrowly applied in Royal Drug, it would appear impossible for any provider
arrangements to qualify for exemption because by definition provider arrangements do not exist
between the insured and the insurer. Certainly the decision established a reasonable doubt as
to whether provider arrangements previously qualifying on the basis of factors ignored by the
19791
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ruling, however, is not fully dispositive of the scope to be given the term
"business of insurance." In this respect the decision leaves several important
questions unanswered. First, the decision does not resolve the issue of
inter-industry versus intra-industry agreements. The ideological conflict still
exists between permitting intra-industry agreements to fix premium rates
based upon shared actuarial data 88 and denying inter-industry provider
agreements which also operate to fix premium rates. Second, although the
Court failed to evaluate the Pharmacy Agreement in regard to factors previ-
ously considered relevant to the procuring of exemptive status, 89 the Royal
Drug decision fell short of actually denying the continued applicability of
these factors. 90 Therefore, until future decisions test the viability of these
factors, the rigidity of the Royal Drug guidelines will remain questionable.
As alluded to previously, the ramifications of the Royal Drug decision
upon the insurance industry in general, and particularly upon pre-paid drug
protection policies, are potentially of vast importance. There can be little
dispute that provider arrangements such as the Pharmacy Agreement are es-
sential in lowering costs to insurers. 91 Without the benefit of such arrange-
ments, the insurer's cost increases in providing prepaid drug protection
Royal Drug Court would receive exemptive status if required to qualify today. See notes 54-57
and accompanying text supra.
88. 440 U.S. at 221-22.
89. See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
90. 440 U.S. at 211-33.
91. The Court conceded that there may in fact be just such a connection. ld.' at 214. See
also Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 561
F.2d 262, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3375 (1977), in which the
court stated, "Of central significance in this entire context is the close relationship between the
cost of reimbursing damage claims, on the one hand, and the insurance rates charged by appel-
lees, on the other."
In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093
(1973), a private insurance company brought suit against Blue Cross claiming that by coercing
hospitals into signing a provider agreement prescribing the amounts and terms of reimburse-
ment, Blue Cross had violated § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act. The terms of the contracts were
such that Blue Cross was able to offer lower rates than competing insurance companies. In
asserting the existence of a strong interrelationship between the hospital payments and the
subscribers' rates, the court relied upon the following testimony of Herbert S. Denenberg,
Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner:
Q. Commissioner, in carrying out the responsibilities of your office as you see
them, what relation, if any, have you found to exist between a Blue Cross plan
reimbursement contract with its hospitals and the Blue Cross plan subscriber rates?
A. Well, these two things are really indivisible aspects reflecting the same
economic forces. If you do not have a sound contract between Blue Cross and the
hospitals that control cost and quality then the Blue Cross rate to the subscribers is
going to be unreasonable.
Id. at 83, n.9. See also Herzlinger, Can We Control Health Costs? 56 HARv. Bus. REV. 102,
108-09 (Mar.-April 1978); Commercial Health and Accident Insurance Industry: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92nd
Cong., 2d Sess., Part 1, 387 (1972).
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appear destined to be reflected in an increase in consumer premiums. 92
The possibility that such policies will be priced out of the marketplace
is not an irrational conjecture. 93 In addition, similar consequences may occur in
other insurance contexts which utilize the concept of third party payors. 94
Finally, because prepaid drug protecton is often an important part of negotiated
settlements between labor and industry,95 the potential effects upon the economy
as a whole cannot be overlooked.
Additionally, the Royal Drug decision significantly increases the probabil-
ity that plaintiffs will be successful in bringing action against insurance com-
panies under federal law. The Court has increased the applicability of federal
antitrust statutes to the insurance industry by reducing the scope of the
McCarran exemption. As the dominance of state regulation is reduced, the
consumer may be expected to benefit. First, the consumer will have greater
access to the treble-damage remedies provided by federal legislation. 96
Second, increased federal regulation of the insurance industry may provide
the consumer with more uniform treatment than is currently available due to
the variance in both the extent and effectiveness of existing state regula-
tions. 97
CONCLUSION
Royal Drug is the Court's latest decision in a series of holdings aimed at
reducing the potential for exemption from federal antitrust regulation under
the McCarran Act. The judiciary has given notice that a competitive market
within the insurance industry shall not be deterred by the promulgation of
broad statutory interpretations. The consequences of the Court's decision,
however, may go beyond the mere encouragement of competition. In fact,
this decision may function as an influential consideration in the continuance
92. Because the provider agreement improves the predictability of health-care service costs
it provides the insurer with some control over these costs so that he may calculate and minimize
premium rates. Without such an arrangement an unpredictable and substantial increase in pre-
mium rates would be inevitable. Klarman, The Economics of Hospital Service, 29 HARv. Bus.
REV. 71, 79-80 (Sept. 1951). See also note 75 supra.
93. The attraction of such policies is that they establish a ceiling upon drug purchases made
by the policyholder. If the insurer is unable to control costs through provider arrangements and
is therefore forced to adopt premiums which conform with the actual acquisition and overhead
expenses of the pharmacies, the higher premiums thereby necessitated could conceivably so
reduce the number of policyholders as to result in the product's removal from the marketplace.
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and creation of the actual insurance products themselves. At a time when
insurance companies should be aggressively involved in containing skyrocket-
ing health-care costs, Royal Drug may necessitate a redirection on the part
of the industry. It appears that under the auspices of the judiciary, federal
antitrust laws finally have succeeded in emasculating state regulations and
invading areas once regarded as sacrosanct under the McCarran Act.
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